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CROSS-APPELLANTS ' REPLY BRIEF
SCOPE OF REPLY
This reply

brief will

address two

issues raised by cross-

respondent, John P. Sampson ("Sampson"), in his brief:
1.

Whether

standard in

the

district

concluding that

court

applied

an

incorrect

no award of punitive damages should

be assessed against Sampson.
2.

Whether the district court's

refusal to

award damages

to the Richins Parties in an amount equal to all monies collected
and disbursed by Sampson during the first twenty-eight

months of

his

should be

unlawful

control

of

the

Limited

Partnerships

reversed.
ARGUMENT I.
The Overwhelmingly Reckless and
Predatory Nature of Sampson's
Conduct Requires The Imposition
of Punitive Damages
A.

Sampson's conduct is the type of

mandating

the

imposition

of

punitive

respondent's brief, Sampson correctly
punitive

damages

is

an

this one:

a

"extraordinary

however, to
case in

default judgments

which a

In tiis crossan award of

event" which should be

(Sampson Brief, p. 34).

imagine a

It

case more exceptional than

lawyer purposely

allows numerous

to be entered against his clients (R. 2081); a

case in which a lawyer receives
funds (R.

damages.

observes that

awarded only in "exceptional cases."
is difficult,

"extraordinary event"

2051); a

case in

and wrongfully

disburses client

which a lawyer purchases, and later

sues on, a judgment obtained against his former clients (R. 205052, 2059,

2124, 2202-03);

a case

in which

implements and executes a six year plan to
former

clients'

Parties'

Brief,

solicits

the

business
pp.

IRS'

6-23);

interests;
and,

cooperation

in
2

a

a lawyer conceives,
seize control

(See
case

generally
in

liquidating

which

of his
Richins
a lawyer

those business

interests-

(Exhibits 298 and 300; R. 2125-26).

Clearly, contrary to Sampson's assertion, this is not a case
of "mere

inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like"

which Section 908 of the Restatement

(Second) of

does not

punitive damages*

justify the

imposition of

the Richins Parties have
demonstrating

the

satisfied the

existence

of

an

Torts suggests
As such,

threshold requirement of
event

so

extraordinarily

shocking as to require the imposition of exemplary damages.
B.
for

In applying a requirement that Sampson

punitive

misconduct,
applicable

damages
the

District

standard

findings of fact
stated, "[h]e

only

and

for

upon
Court

the

[Sampson] should

intentionally

added).

The

Utah

of

of

of

such

law,

intentional

heightened
damages.

the

to

support

a

In its

district court

it."

Court,

(R.

however,

2187) (Emphasis
has

expressly

determined that willful intent on the part of a defendant
required

the

have known the law, but I do not

violated

Supreme

showing

improperly

award

conclusions

believe he

a

could be liable

punitive

damages award.

is not

In Behrens v.

Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) the
court held that:
"A defendant's conduct must be malicious qr_
in reckless disregard for the rights of
others, although
actual intent to cause
injury is not necessary." (Emphasis added).
Notably, the test announced by the
3

court is

in the disjunctive,

allowing a

plaintiff to premise punitive damages on a showing of

malicious conduct or reckless disregard for the rights of others.
Furthermore, the
Sampson was

in many

district court
of the

things he

himself to be right in doing what
them."

(R. 2187).

Again,

he

(Utah

1975),

of mind.
the

"As wrong as

did, I think he believes
did

and

the

wgty

he did

however, the Utah Supreme Court has

long held that punitive damages are
defendant's state

stated that,

In

court

available regardless

of the

Kessler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354

pointed

out

that,

"[d]espite

[defendant's] argument that he was but attempting to enforce what
he believed to be his legal rights" the evidence showed
conduct was

willful and warranted punitive damages.

It was the defendant's "wrongful conduct"
to sustain the punitive damages award.
In

this

this principle

case,

the

and its

that his

Id. at 359.

that caused

the court

Id.

district court's apparent rejection of
substitution of

a qualitatively steeper

standard of intentional conduct constitutes reversible error.
C.

Sampson's

conduct

was

particularly

contemptible

in

light of his fiduciary duty toward the Richins Parties.
Among
damages

the

various

award

is

factors
the

to

1982).

relationship.

The

considered

for

a punitive

relationship between the parties.

Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
(Utah

be

case

at

Feedyards. 653
bar

That relationship

involves

has been
4

First

P.2d 591, 598-99
an attorney/client

characterized as "one

of

extreme

personal

trust

and

Lachmunb's Estate, 170 P.2d
relationship

between

an

fiduciary in

its nature

confidential character,
good faith.
highest

It is

at

and of

a
and

Section

attorney/client relationship

of

the

The district

which

that

In

re

Moreover, "the
client

is

highly

delicate, exacting, and

relation,

confidence

.

(1980).

has ceased,

involving the

. ."

7 Am. Jur. 2d

And,

even

if

the

the attorney's loyalty

Id. at Section

relationship,

it

120.

was

Sampson's

predatory

and

court failed to attach sufficient weight

to the existence of that relationship, and the
to

."

alone, was reckless; undertaken in the context

attorney/client

abusive.

.

high degree of fidelity and

personal

to the client is not discharged.
conduct, standing

his

a very

119

.

1946).

and

requiring a

trust

Law,

(Ore.

attorney

purely

personal

Attorneys

748

confidence

relationship

was

incredible extent

abused, in declining to award

punitive damages.
D.

Sampson misconstrues

punitive damages.

In

"acted in good faith"
Richins Parties'
37).

the

standard

of

the

district

court

claim for punitive damages.

whether

punitive

award of

Clayton

properly

denied the

(Sampson Brief, p.

never been

the primary

damages are properly recoverable.

Indeed, the element of bad faith is only
that standard.

the

his brief, Sampson argues that because he

However, a good faith standard has

measure

for

v. Crossroads
5

one small

component of

Equipment, Co., 655 P.2d

1125, 1131

(Utah 1982).

The

district court's unwillingness to

apply that principle must be rectified.
ARGUMENT II.
Sampson Has Failed To Refute The Richins
Parties1 Claim to Damages In An Amount
Equal To All Monies That He Collected
And Disbursed During The First
28 Months of His Unlawful Control
of The Limited Partnerships
The law is, of course, well settled that
can

claim

no

interest

or

rights of the partnership."
742, 746

(W.D. Okla. 1982).

right

"a limited partner

in the assets, properties or

Wroblewski v. Brucher,

Accord, Harline v. Dairies, 562 P.2d

1120 (Utah 1977); Tomlin v. Ceres Corporation, 507
(5th

Cir.

233, 238

1975);
(Wash.

agreements at

Bassan
1974).

550 F. Supp.

F.2d 642, 648

v. Investment Exchange Corp., 524 P.2d
Nothing

in

the

limited partnership

issue in this case alters that principle,

Each of

those agreements provided that:
"The general partner [the Richtron Companies]
shall have full charge of the management,
conduct, and operation of the partnership
affairs in all respects and in all matters .
. . No limited partner shall take part in
the conduct or control of the affairs of the
partnership. . ."
Therefore, once the district court correctly
only the

lawfully installed

general partner

Richtron General) had authority
funds, R.

to

collect

concluded that

(Richtron, Inc. or
limited partnership

2210, and that Sampson's use of those funds was ". . .
6

unauthorized

as

Richtron,

Inc.,

complete control over partnership
amount

of

diverted

funds

--

remained general partner with
affairs,"

$645,101.38

R.

2236,

the full

-- should have been

awarded to the Richins Parties. 1
Interestingly, in his brief, Sampson seeks to side-step that
issue

by

arguing

without

any accurate reference to the record

that those monies were used " . . .
partnerships."

(Sampson Brief,

for the benefit of the limited
p. 39).

In doing so, however,

Sampson conveniently ignores the fact that Section 48-1-35 of the
Utah

Uniform

General

mechanism for seizure

Partnership
and

Act

possession

of

establishes

a

clear

partnership property:

(i) payment to the incumbent general partner of the value of such
partner's interest in the partnership or (ii) procural of a court
approved bond.

There

is nothing

in the record to suggest that

Sampson ever understood, let alone complied with, that provision.
That

failure

renders

him

occasioned by his unlawful
property.

The district

personally
control of

liable

for

all damages

the Limited Partnerships'

court's conclusion to the contrary must

1

This is the amount taken by Sampson between June 1980
and November, 1982, the period during which the district court
determined he had no colorable authority to serve as general
partner.
(R. 2123).
On October 29, 1982, he arguably acquired
such authority through his purchase at an IRS tax sale of
various assets of the Richtron Companies. Thus, the Richins
Parties are seeking on this issue an award of damages only for
the 28 month period of Sampson's undeniably illegal assumption of
control of the Limited Partnerships.
7

be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
the judgment

of the

and, (ii)

Parties for the

should reverse

district court and remand with instructions

to (i) determine the amount of
from Sampson

this Court

punitive damages

enter judgment

additional

principal

to be extracted

in favor
sum

of

of the Richins
$645,101.38 plus

interest•
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